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INVENTORY LENDER AS A GOOD FAITH PURCHASER
FOR VALUE: PRIORITY PROBLEMS IN U.C.C. 2-702
Section 2-702 of the Uniform Commercial Code (Code)' governs a seller's
right to reclaim goods sold on credit to a buyer who was insolvent when the
buyer received the goods. 2 If a seller can establish a prima facie case for

1. U.C.C. § 2-702 (1978) (all citations are to the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.)
as amended in 1972). U.C.C. section 2-702 provides in pertinent part:
(2) Where the seller discovers that the buyer has received goods on credit while
insolvent he may reclaim the goods upon demand made within ten days after the
receipt, but if misrepresentation of solvency has been made to the particular seller in
writing within three months before delivery the ten day limitation does not apply.
Except as provided in this subsection the seller may not base a right to reclaim goods
on the buyer's fraudulent or innocent misrepresentation of solvency or of intent to
pay.
(3) The seller's right to reclaim under subsection (2) is subject to the rights of
a buyer in ordinary course or other good faith purchaser under this Article (Section
2-403). Successful reclamation of goods excludes all other remedies with respect to
them. As amended 1966.
U.C.C. § 2-702(2) and (3).
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (Conference) originally sponsored the U.C.C. Schnader, A Short History of the Preparationand Enactment of
the Uniform Commercial Code, 22 U. MiAm L. REv. 1, 1-2 (1967). The Conference sponsored
the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law in 1896 and by 1933 had sponsored six other uniform
acts involving commercial law. Id. The acts originally sponsored by the Conference, however,
were outdated by the late 1930's. Malcolm, The Uniform Commercial Code in the United
States, 12 INT'L & Conp. L.Q. 226, 229 (1963). In 1940, William A. Schnader, president of the
Conference, persuaded the Conference to begin preparation of a comprehensive code governing
commercial law. Schnader, supra, at 1. By 1944, the Conference had persuaded the American
Law Institute to join the Conference as a co-sponsor of the Code. WHrrE & SuMMERs,
UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE 3 (2d ed. 1980). The Conference published the first official text of the
U.C.C. in 1951. Id. In 1953, Pennsylvania became the first state to adopt the Code. Id. at 4.
By 1957, the Conference promulgated another version of the Code, including numerous changes
suggested by the New York State Law Revision Commission. Symposium, Panel Discussion on
the Uniform Commercial Code: Report of the New York Law Revision Commission, 12 Bus.
LAW. 49, 49-50 (1956). Forty-nine states and the District of Columbia had adopted the U.C.C.
by 1948. 1 U.L.A. xxvi (Master ed. 1976). In most instances, states enacting the U.C.C. have
followed not only the section headings and sections of the official version, but also have preserved
the official version's numbering system. Id. See generally Dunham, A History of the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 30 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 233, 233-49
(1965) (discussing history of National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws);
Mentschikoff, The Uniform CommercialCode: An Experiment in Democracy in Drafting,36 A.B.A.J.
419, 419-20 (1950) (general information on Uniform Commercial Code); Malcolm, supraat 229-46
(general information on history of Uniform Commercial Code); Schnader, supra, at 1-12 (general
information on enactment of Uniform Commercial Code); Llewellyn, Why We Need the Uniform
Commercial Code, 10 U. FLA. L. REV. 367, 367-81 (1975) (discussing purposes behind Uniform
Commercial Code).
2. U.C.C. § 2-702(2). Both the official comment to the Code and commentators suggest
that a seller's right of reclamation stems from a buyer's implied or express representation of
solvency when the buyer purchases goods from a seller. See id. at comment 2 (suggesting that
§ 2-702(2) is based on buyer's fraud against seller); Anderson, The Reclaiming Seller Under U.C.C.
Section 2-702 vs. His FourHorsemen of the Apocolypse, 8 ST. MARY's L.J. 271, 289-91 (1976)
(same).
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reclamation under section 2-702(2), the seller normally will prevail in his
reclamation action when the insolvent buyer is the only other party laying
claim to the goods.3 A seller's right of reclamation, however, becomes more
complicated if a third party lays claim to the goods.4 Section 2-702(3) of the
Code makes a seller's right to reclaim goods subject to, interalia, the rights

of a good faith purchaser for value

In the context of a credit sale

transaction, a seller transfers voidable title to an insolvent buyer and the

insolvent buyer can, in turn, transfer good title to any party that qualifies
as a good faith purchaser under section 2-702(3).6 Consequently, a seller's

3. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 1, at 1025-26. A seller's right to reclaim goods
sold to an insolvent buyer is conditioned upon the buyer's insolvency when the seller delivers
the goods and upon the seller's demand for reclamation within 10 days of the seller's delivery
of goods to the buyer. U.C.C. § 2-702(2); WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 1, at 1025-26. If an
insolvent buyer makes representations of solvency in writing to a seller within three months of
the seller's delivery of goods to the buyer, then the 10 day limitation period in which the seller
must make his reclamation demand does not apply. U.C.C. § 2-702(2); WHITE & SUMMERS,
supra note 1, at 1025.
4. U.C.C. § 2-702(3). Section 2-702(3) of the U.C.C. makes a seller's right to reclaim
goods subject to the rights of other parties. Id.; see infra notes 5-6 and accompanying text
(explaining third party rights to goods sold to insolvent buyer that are superior to seller's
reclamation right).
5. U.C.C. § 2-702(3). A seller's right to reclaim goods from an insolvent buyer is subject
to the rights of a buyer in the ordinary course of business, a good faith purchaser, and, in a
majority of states (33), a lien creditor. Id. In 1966, the Code drafters amended the official
version of section 2-702(3) of the Code removing lien creditors as parties whose rights are
superior to reclaiming sellers. 3 HAWKLAND, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES, § 2-702, at
237-39 (1984). A majority of states, however, have not adopted the 1966 amendment. Id. The
rights of a lien creditor under § 2-702 have sparked a great deal of controversy. See Braucher,
Reclamation of Goods From A FraudulentBuyer, 65 MIcH. L. REv. 1281, 1281 (1967) (citing
numerous articles discussing issue whether lien creditor is purchaser who defeats rights of
reclaiming seller under § 2-702(3)). The controversy over the definition of "lien creditor" in
section 2-702(3) stemmed from confusion over whether the seller's right to reclaim was
subordinate to the claim of a trustee in bankruptcy. Anderson, supra note 2, at 282-83. Section
70c of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 gave a trustee in bankruptcy the status of a lien creditor
upon the debtor's insolvency. BANKRUPTCY ACT § 70c, I1 U.S.C. § 110(c) (1970). If, however,
the seller's right to reclaim is subject to the claim of a trustee in bankruptcy, then the section
2-702 reclamation right is of little value. The 1966 amendment to the Code removing the lien
creditor from the class of parties in section 2-702(3) that defeats the rights of a reclaiming seller
was an attempt by the Code drafters to reconcile the conflict between the U.C.C. and the
Bankruptcy Act. HAWKLAND, supra, at 239; see Henson, Reclamation Rights of Sellers Under
Section 2-702, 21 N.Y.L.F. 41, 41-54 (1975) (discussing issues surrounding rights of lien creditor
under § 2-702(3)); Kennedy, The Interest of a Reclaiming Seller Under Article 2 of the Code,
30 Bus. LAW. 833, 833-45 (1975) (discussing rights of lien creditor in light of bankruptcy law).
While the definition of a "lien creditor" under section 2-702(3) involves complicated
issues of bankruptcy law, the definition of the "buyer in ordinary course" poses few problems.
Anderson, supra note 2, at 274-75. To defeat the reclaiming seller, a buyer must purchase from
a person who deals in goods of the kind purchased. See U.C.C. § 1-201(9) (definition of "buyer
in ordinary course of business"). Case law suggests that a buyer in ordinary course includes
not only consumers but also retailers and agents. Colonial Fin. Co. v. De Benigno, 125 Conn.
626,-, 7 A.2d 841, 843 (1939).
6. U.C.C. § 2-403(1); see also U.C.C. § 2-702(3). Section 2-702(3) of the Code states
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right to reclaim goods from an insolvent buyer when a third party also lays

claim to the goods often turns on a court's definition of "purchaser" as
7
used in section 2-702(3) of the Code.
The Code defines the term "purchaser" in section 1-201(33) as one who

takes by purchase. 8 Section 1-201(32) defines "purchase" as taking by any
voluntary transaction creating an interest in property. 9 All courts agree that

an Article 9 secured creditor fits within the Code definition of purchaser.10
If a creditor takes a security interest in a seller's goods after the seller
delivers the goods to an insolvent buyer, the secured creditor has "purchased" an interest in the goods" and, under section 2-702(3), the secured2
creditor's claim to the goods defeats the seller's right to reclaim the goods.

Courts are not in agreement, however, on whether a secured creditor with a
floating lien qualifies as a "purchaser" under section 2-702(3). a

that a seller's right of reclamation is subject to the rights of certain third parties. Id. Section 2702 does not explain those third party rights explicitly. Id. Instead, section 2-702(3) refers to
section 2-403, a section that governs the power of a party to transfer good title. Id. Section 2403 explains that a buyer with voidable title can transfer good title to a good faith purchaser
for value. U.C.C. § 2-403(1). Neither section 2-403(1) nor any other section of the U.C.C.
defines voidable title. Anderson, supra note 2, at 277. The Code, however, does list four
examples of voidable title in section 2-403(l)(a) through (d). Id. While the credit sales transaction
is not included among the examples of voidable title in section 2-403(1), the examples listed
therein are not exhaustive. Anderson, supra note 2, at 277-78; see also Matter of Samuels &
Co., Inc., 526 F.2d 1238, 1241 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 834. In Matter of Samuels
& Co., Inc., (Samuels 11), the Fifth Circuit explained the relationship between section 2-702
and section 2-403 as part of an overall Code plan favoring the free flow of goods. Id. As support
for its assertion that the Code favors the free flow of goods, the Samuels IH court cited sections
2-403, 3-302, 3-305, 6-110, 7-501, 7-502, 8-301, 9-307, and 9-309 of the Code. Id. at 1241, n.2.
7. See Anderson, supranote 2, at 275-76. Professor Anderson suggests that since "value"
and "good faith" pose few definitional problems, the definition of "purchaser" is most
important in determining who qualifies as a good faith purchaser for value under section 2702(3). Id.
8. U.C.C. § 1-201(33).
9. U.C.C. § 1-201(32).
10. See, e.g., In re Bensar Co., Inc., 38 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 823, 828 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio
1984) (holding that secured creditor qualifies as purchaser); In re Bowman, 25 U.C.C. REP.
SERV. 738, 742-44 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1978) (same); In re American Food Purveyors, 17 U.C.C.
RaP. SERv. 436, 441 (N.D. Ga. 1974) (conceding that Code definition of purchaser is broad
enough to include Article 9 secured creditor); QUINN, QUINN's UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
COMMENTARY AND LAW DsoasT, at s2-337 (1985 Cum. Supp. No. 2).
11. See Samuels I1, 526 F.2d at 1242 (holding that secured creditor qualifies as purchaser
under § 1-201(33) of Code); In re Bensar Co., Inc., 38 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 823, 834-35 (Bankr.
S.D. Ohio 1984) (same); In re Bowman, 25 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 738, 745 (Bankr. N.D. Ga.
1978) (same); In re Hayward Woolen Co., 3 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 1107, 1111-12 (D. Mass. 1967)
(same); Eagle Chrysler-Dodge v. Genesee Merchants, 372 N.W.2d 546, 549 (Mich. Ct. App.
1985) (same).
12. U.C.C. § 2-702(3).
13. Compare American Food Purveyors, 17 U.C.C. REP. SERV. at 441 (holding that § 2702(3) does not protect Article 9 secured creditors) with In re Bowman, 25 U.C.C. REP. SERV.
738, 742 (N.D. Ga. 1978) (secured floating lien creditor qualifies as purchaser for value under
§ 2-702(3)) and Eagle Chrysler-Dodge Sales v. Genesee Merchants Bank & Trust Co., 143 Mich.
App. 339,---_, 372 N.W.2d 546, 548-49 (1985) (same).
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A creditor establishes a floating lien by including an after-acquired
property clause in a security agreement. 4 An after-acquired property clause

gives a creditor an interest in a buyer's future inventory."s Most courts
broadly interpret the Code definition of purchaser to include a secured
creditor with a floating lien.' 6 In In re Samuels,'7 the United States Court of

Appeals for the Fifth Circuit adopted a literal reading of the Code definition
of "purchaser.""'

In Samuels, a seller sold cattle to an insolvent meat

packer.' 9 After learning of the meat packer's insolvency, the seller sought to
14. U.C.C. § 9-204. Comment 1 to section 9-204 makes clear that an after-acquired
property clause creates a security interest in after-acquired property without further action by
the secured party. Id. at comment 1. Consequently, a secured creditor need not negotiate a
supplemental agreement to acquire an interest in a debtor's incoming inventory. Id.
15. U.C.C. § 9-204(3).
16. See, e.g., Samuels II, 523 F.2d at 1242 (holding that secured creditor with floating
lien "purchased" interest in defrauded seller's goods); Bensar, 38 U.C.C. REP. SERV. at 834-35
(same); Bowman, 25 U.C.C. REp. SErv. at 745 (same); Hayward Woolen, 3 U.C.C. REP.SERV.
at 1111-12 (same); Eagle Chrysler-Dodge, 372 N.W.2d at 548-49 (same); WHITE & SUMMERS,
supra note 1, at 1007 (maintaining that secured creditor purchases interest in inventory via
floating lien).
17. 526 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir. 1976) (Samuels I1), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 834. In the first
decision issued in In re Samuels & Co., Inc., Judge Godbold dissented from the majority's
holding that allowed a seller to reclaim goods from a bankrupt buyer despite the existence of a
secured creditor with a floating lien on the buyer's inventory. In re Samuels & Co., Inc., 510
F.2d 139, 144 (5th Cir. 1975) (Samuels I). On rehearing en banc, the Fifth Circuit adopted
Godbold's dissenting opinion in the earlier case as the majority opinion. Samuels 11, 526 F.2d
at 1241. Judge Godbold claimed that his position that a secured creditor with a floating lien
can defeat a reclaiming seller was the result of a "meticulous and dispassionate reading" of the
Code. Id.
18. See supra note 17 (Judge Godbold's opinion that found secured creditor with floating
lien to be purchaser was result of strict reading of Code).
19. Samuels I, 510 F.2d at 144. In the final decision of Samuels II, the Fifth Circuit
adopted Judge Godbold's dissenting opinion from an earlier hearing of the case and did not
recite the facts of the case. Samuels II, 526 F.2d at 1238-41. Consequently, the facts of Samuels
II are cited from 510 F.2d 139, the earlier Samuels opinion. Samuels involved a cash sale
transaction. Samuels 1, 510 F.2d at 14446. In Samuels I, the Fifth Circuit found that since the
sale of cattle was a cash transaction, the sellers had not yet relinquished title when the sellers
discovered the buyer's insolvency. Id. The Samuels I court based its holding on the distinction
between cash and credit sales. Id. At common law, the "cash sale doctrine" governed cash
sales. See Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63 YALE L.J. 1057,
1060-62 (1954) (general discussion of cash sale doctrine). Under the cash sale doctrine, a buyer
for cash did not receive title to goods until the buyer had paid the full purchase price. See
Harmon v. Goetter, 87 Ala. 325,-,
6 So. 93, 94 (1889) (buyer must pay price before
receiving title to goods); Masoner v. Bell, 20 Okla. 618,-, 95 P. 239, 240-41 (1908) (same).
Consequently, if a good faith purchaser bought goods from a party who had not yet paid the
full purchase price for the goods, the good faith purchaser could not acquire title to the goods.
See Gilmore, supra, at 1060-62. A seller who sold goods on credit, however, transfered title to
the goods upon delivery. BENJAMIN, BENJAMIN ON SALES §§ 796 & 799 (2d ed. 1887). Consequently, a person who bought on credit could transfer good title to a good faith purchaser for
value. Guckeen Farmers Elevator Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 269 Minn. 127,_._, 130 N.W.2d 69,
72-74 (1964); Ross v. Leuci, 194 Misc. 345, 350, 85 N.Y.S.2d 497, 499-500 (Civ. Ct. N.Y.
1949). Code drafters abolished the cash sale doctrine, opting for the voidable title concept
found in U.C.C. section 2-403. U.C.C. § 2-403. Section 2-403 allows a buyer with voidable title
to transfer good title to a good faith purchaser for value. Id.
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reclaim from the meat packer the proceeds obtained from the sale of the
cattle.2 0 A secured inventory lender of the meat packer, who claimed to be
a good faith purchaser of an interest in the cattle, contested the seller's right
to reclaim. 2' The secured creditor claimed that under an after-acquired
property clause in his security agreement a voluntary lien attached to the
cattle as soon as the seller delivered the cattle to the buyer. 22 The secured
creditor argued that since the floating lien was the result of a voluntary
transaction creating an interest in the cattle, the secured creditor qualified as
a purchaser under sections 1-201(32) and 1-201(33) of the Code.23 The Fifth
Circuit agreed, finding that the Code definition of purchaser is broad enough
to include an Article 9 secured creditor who negotiates a floating lien on the
debtor's inventory. 24 Citing sections 1-201(32) and 1-201(33) of the Code,
the court in Samuels noted that "purchase" includes taking by lien. 25 The
Fifth Circuit also noted that including secured creditors within the definition
of a section 2-702(3) purchaser2 6 is consistent with the Code policy of promoting the free flow of goods.
Even if a court finds that a secured creditor is a good faith purchaser
under section 2-702(3), the secured creditor's right to take good title from a
buyer with voidable title under section 2-403 attaches only if the creditor
gives value for his interest in the buyer's inventory. 27 If a secured creditor
has a lien on a buyer's present and future inventory by way of an afteracquired property clause, then the secured creditor's interest automatically28
attaches to the goods as soon as the seller delivers the goods to the buyer.
Some courts and commentators suggest that the secured creditor must
advance "new" or "contemporaneous" value to the buyer to purchase a

20. Samuels I, 510 F.2d at 144. Samuels involved a cash seller's attempt to reclaim goods
after the depository bank dishonored the buyer's checks. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. The secured creditor in Samuels argued that the reclaiming seller merely was an
unsecured creditor and that the secured creditor's perfected security interest took precedence
over the seller's unperfected interest. Id. The Samuels I court held that the seller's reclamation
right was not a security interest, but rather a right to rescind the transaction with the insolvent
buyer. Id. at 148-50. On rehearing, however, the Samuels II court intimated that the seller's
reclamation right may qualify as an unperfected security interest. See Samuels II, 526 F.2d at
1248 (holding that reclaiming seller loses to secured creditor but prevails over general creditors).
24. Samuels II, 526 F.2d at 1242.
25. Id. The Samuels H court concluded that since the definition of purchaser under the
Code is broad enough to include those taking by sale, voluntary mortgage, gift, pledge or lien,
the definition of purchaser is broad enough to include an Article 9 secured creditor. Id.
26. Id. at 1241; see supra note 6 (listing Code provisions supporting policy of promoting
free flow of goods).
27. U.C.C. § 2-403(1) (describing rights of purchaser for value). The Code defines value
in § 1-201(44) as "consideration sufficient to support a simple contract." U.C.C. § 1-201(44)(d).
28. See Anderson, supra note 2, at 280. Professor Anderson characterizes the attachment
of a secured party's lien to after-acquired property of the buyer as an "unconscious" purchase
that is "hardly voluntary." Id. Professor Anderson concludes that a secured creditor should
give new value to qualify as a purchaser under section 2-703(2). Id. at 300.
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valid interest in the buyer's incoming inventory. 29 In In re Hayward Woolen

Company,30 however, the United States District Court for the District of
Massachusetts determined that a secured creditor's preexisting claim constitutes value sufficient for a creditor's purchase of a security interest in future
inventory.' But the district court did note that the secured creditor in
Hayward Woolen had advanced $25,000 to the buyer shortly before the seller
delivered goods to the buyer.32 In sum, while the court in Hayward Woolen

suggested in dicta that a secured creditor need not give "new" value to
purchase an interest in the debtor's goods, the court also emphasized that
the creditor in Hayward Woolen had made recent monetary advancements
to the debtor in consideration for an interest in the incoming inventory."
Most courts, however, hold that an antecedent debt alone is value sufficient

to establish a floating lien creditor as a purchaser of an interest in incoming
34
inventory.
Code language supports the widely accepted interpretation that a section

2-702(3) purchaser includes a floating lien secured creditor.33 The majority
36
interpretation, however, undermines the section 2-702 reclamation right.

Most commercial buyers, especially buyers on the verge of insolvency, will
have at least one secured creditor with a floating lien on the buyer's
inventory.3 7 Consequently, if a secured inventory lender with a floating lien

29. Id. at 282; McDonnell, The Floating Lienor as a Good Faith Purchaser,50 S. CAL.
L.R. 429, 460 (1977) (courts should require that secured creditors advance new value to debtors
to acquire interest in debtor's incoming inventory); Anderson, supra note 2, at 300 (same);
American Food Purveyors, 17 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 436, 441 (N.D. Ga. 1974) (same); cf. In re
Hayward Woolen Co., 3 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 1107, 1111 (D. Mass. 1967) (emphasizing that
secured creditor advanced contemporaneous value in holding that secured creditor purchased
interest in buyer's inventory).
30. 3 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 1107 (D. Mass. 1967).
31. Id. at 1111. The In re Hayward Woolen court based its conclusion that a preexisting
debt constitutes value on the Code definition of value in section 1-201(44)(b). Id.; U.C.C. § 1201(44)(b).
32. Id. The Hayward Woolen court noted that the secured creditor had advanced $25,000
contemporaneous value after the court had concluded that a preexisting debt constitutes value.
Id.
33. Id.
34. See, e.g., Holiday Rambler Corp. v. Morris, 32 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 1222, 1225 (D.
Kan. 1981) (holding that consideration sufficient to support simple contract constitutes value
sufficient to purchase interest in buyer's future inventory); Eagle Chrysler-Dodge Sales, Inc. v.
Genesee Merchants Bank & Trust Co., 372 N.W.2d 546, 548 (Mich. App. 1985); First Citizens
Bank and Trust Co. v. Academic Archives, 8 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 1197, 1201 (N.C. Ct. App.
1971) (same). But see American Food Purveyors, 17 U.C.C. REP. SERV. at 441 (suggesting that
secured creditor must give new consideration to purchase interest in buyer's inventory).
35. See U.C.C. § 1-201(32) (Code definition of purchase includes any voluntary transaction
creating interest in property); id. at § 9-204(1) (after-acquired property clause is permitted
in security agreement); supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text (discussing floating lien and
after-acquired property clause).
36. See infra notes 37-42 and accompanying text (reclamation right has little value if
floating lien defeats seller's reclamation right).
37. United States v. Westside Bank, 38 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 705, 712 (5th Cir. 1984);
Anderson, supra note 2, at 279.

19861

INVENTOR Y LENDER

1357

can defeat a seller's right to reclaim, a seller's section 2-702 reclamation right
has little value.3 8 The secured creditor, on the other hand, often negotiates
a floating lien on the buyer's entire inventory to secure payment for a debt
of less than the value of the inventory. 39 Thus, the secured creditor sometimes
is able to satisfy his interest without resorting to proceeds from the defrauded
seller's goods.4 A few courts and commentators have determined that the

floating lien secured creditor should not necessarily qualify as a purchaser
for value under section 2-702(3).41 These courts and commentators maintain
that the rights of a secured creditor with a 42floating lien are not necessarily

superior to the rights of a reclaiming seller.
While most courts find that the position favoring a reclaiming seller over
a floating lien secured creditor conflicts with Code language, the minority
view has support in both Code and pre-Code history. 43 At common law,
courts did not look favorably upon the floating lien. 4 Some pre-Code courts
4
simply invalidated floating liensY.
Other courts concluded under common

38. Westside Bank, 38 U.C.C. REP. SERV. at 712. The Westside Bank court noted that
the section 2-702 reclamation right only attaches upon a buyer's insolvency. Id. The Westside
Bank court maintained that allowing the presence of a floating lien to destroy the seller's
reclamation right "would in most cases emasculate the reclamation remedy" since secured
creditors normally deplete an insolvent buyer's assets before general creditors can satisfy their
claims. Id.
39. See American Food Purveyors, 17 U.C.C. REP. SEav. at 444 (secured creditor was
able to recover all of his interest in buyer's inventory without resorting to seller's goods);
Skilton, Security Interests in After Acquired Property Under the Uniform Commercial Code,
1974 Wzs. L. REV. 925, 945 (1974) (allowing floating lien to defeat right of reclaiming seller
may provide windfall to secured creditor at seller's expense).
40. See American Food Purveyors, 17 U.C.C REp. SERV. at 444 (some proceeds from
sales of seller's goods remain after secured creditor satisfied his interest); see also Westside
Bank, 38 U.C.C. REP. SERV. at 712-14 (allowing reclaiming seller right to proceeds remaining
after secured creditors have satisfied interests).
41. See American Food Purveyors, 17 U.C.C. REP. SERV. at 444 (secured creditor does
not qualify as purchaser under § 2-702(3) and § 2-403); supra notes 66-73 and accompanying
text (discussion of American Food Purveyors); McDonnell, supra note 29, at 460 (maintaining
that secured creditor should have to rely on seller's goods as security for payment before secured
creditor can qualify as a purchaser); Anderson, supra note 2, at 299-300 (suggesting that proper
interpretation of "purchaser" in § 2-702(3) is one who gives "new" value for interest in seller's
goods).
42. See American Food Purveyors, 17 U.C.C. REP. SERv. at 444 (seller reclaiming under
§ 2-702(2) defeats all Article 9 secured creditors); infra notes 66-73 and accompanying text
(discussion of American Food Purveyors); McDonnell, supra note 29, at 460 (suggesting that
only secured creditors who rely on defrauded sellers' goods may qualify as purchaser under §
2-702(3)); Anderson, supra note 2, at 299-300 (suggesting that only secured creditors who
advance "new" value for interest in defrauded seller's goods may qualify as purchaser under §
2-702(3)).
43. See infra notes 44-62 and accompanying text (discussion of Code and pre-Code history

of specific and general liens).
44. See infra notes 45-47 and accompanying text (common law courts invalidated or
otherwise defeated purpose of floating lien).
45. See U.C.C. § 9-204 comment 2 (noting common law invalidation of floating liens);
McDonnell, supra note 29, at 435 (noting that invalidation was common law method of

defeating floating lien).
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law that the rights of a secured financier were derivative in nature and since
a debtor has no valid interest in goods purchased while insolvent, the debtor
could not transfer a valid interest to the secured financier. 46 The purpose of

the courts in invalidating the floating lien under common law was to preserve
47
some unencumbered assets on which unsecured creditors could depend.

Financing specialists, however, developed various legal devices that allowed
a debtor to give an interest in most everything the debtor had, including the
4
debtor's inventory, leaving no unencumbered assets for unsecured creditors. 1
The Uniform Commercial Code drafters determined that the common law pro-

hibition against floating liens was not accomplishing its purpose. 4' Therefore,
the Code drafters included the floating lien in the 1948 draft.5 0
In including the floating lien, however, the Code drafters made clear

that a difference existed between specific and general inventory liens." Under
the 1948 Code, creditors took a specific inventory lien on "segregated" units
of the buyer's inventory. 2 As the debtor sold a specific part of the inventory,
the debtor would pay a portion of his debt with the proceeds.

general.5 4 A

3

All other

inventory liens were
floating lien with an after-required property
clause was a general lien because a floating lien granted a creditor an interest
in a buyer's entire inventory, both present and future, as opposed to an
interest in specific items of inventory." The definition of "purchaser" in the

46. See United States v. New Orleans R.R., 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 326, 364-65 (1870). In
United States v. New Orleans R.R., the Supreme Court held that a mortgage intended to cover
after-acquired property could include only as great an interest as the transferor had at the time
the transfer was made. Id. The Supreme Court noted that any other conclusion would be
unjust. Id.; see also Note, The Allocation of After Acquired Mortgage Property Among Rival
Claimants, 40 HARV. L. REV. 222, 240-47 (1926) (arguing that secured financier's interest is
derivative and thus subject to same claims that parties could bring against debtor); Cohen &
Gerber, The After-Acquired Property Clause, 87 U. PA. L. REV. 635, 654-59 (1939) (suggesting
that courts are trying to use floating lien to overcome common law doctrine prohibiting transfer
of future goods).
47. U.C.C. § 9-204 comment 2. The Code drafters maintain in Comment 2 to section 9204 that the invalidation of the floating lien at common law was not improper, but was
ineffective. Id.
48. Id. The Code drafters in Comment 2 to section 9-204 list field warehousing, trust
receipts and factor's lien acts as examples of the various devices used to destroy the "cushion
of free assets" that the floating lien was intended to preserve. Id.
49. 1 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 11.7 (1965).
50. Id.
51. U.C.C. § 7-302(4) (1948 draft) (distinguishing specific and general inventory liens);
id. at § 7-306(2) (setting forth requirements for creating specific inventory lien); id. at § 7308(2) (prohibiting specific inventory liens on after-acquired property).
52. U.C.C. § 7-302(4) (1948 draft) (distinguishing specific and general inventory liens).
53. U.C.C. § 7-306(2) (1948 draft) (setting forth requirements for creating specific
inventory liens).
54. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text (distinguishing specific liens on buyer's
inventory from other liens).
55. See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text (specific liens must create specific
interests and all liens not creating specific interest are general liens).
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1948 Code draft included taking by lien, but expressly limited a purchase to
taking by transactions creating a specific interest in property.56 Since a
secured creditor with a floating lien had a general interest in a buyer's
inventory, the creditor could not qualify as a purchaser under the 1948
7
Code.
Further support that the drafters of the 1948 Code did not intend that
a secured creditor with a floating lien qualify as a purchaser appears in the
Code explanation of the voidable title doctrine.5 8 Under the 1948 Code, a
good faith purchaser acquired good title from a buyer with voidable title
only when the purchaser took actual possession of the goods.5 9 Thus, strictly
construed, the only secured creditor who would qualify as a good faith
purchaser was a pledgee.60 The 1952 Code drafters eliminated both the
distinction between general and specific liens and the requirement of possession before acquiring rights as a good faith purchaser. 61 No evidence exists
in the Code or in Code history, however, suggesting that the changes were
a conscious attempt to expand the definition of purchaser to include a
62
secured creditor with a floating lien.
While common law and Code history provide support for the position
favoring the rights of a reclaiming seller over the rights of a floating lien
secured creditor, 63 the only published decision adopting this position relies
instead on tenuous interpretations of present Code language. 64 Specifically,
the court favoring a reclaiming seller refused to apply the broad Code
definition of purchaser in 1-201(33) to a secured creditor who negotiates a
floating lien to purchase an interest in a debtor's inventory. 65 In In re
American FoodPurveyors,66 the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Georgia had to choose between granting relief to an innocent
seller who was unaware of the unstable financial condition of the buyer or
a less than innocent secured creditor who knew of the buyer's pending

56. U.C.C. Article II, section 56(1) (1948 draft) (Code definition of "purchase").
57. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text (general lienor did not have specific
interest necessary to qualify as purchaser under 1948 Code).
58. See U.C.C. Article II, section 57 (explaining voidable title doctrine).
59. Id. at § 57(6).
60. McDonnell, supra note 29, at 445.
61. See U.C.C. § 7-302 (1949 draft) (eliminating distinction between specific and general
liens); U.C.C. § 2-403(l) (1950 draft) (eliminating requirement of delivery of goods to party for
party to qualify as purchaser of goods).
62. See McDonnell, supra note 29, at 448-49 (suggesting that reason for de-emphasis of
voidable title doctrine was increased interest in entrusting doctrine).
63. See supra notes 43-50 and accompanying text (common law and Code history support
position that floating lien creditor does not qualify as purchaser under § 2-702(3)).
64. See infra note 72 and accompanying text (most courts and commentators consider
American Food Purveyors' holding as contrary to Code language).
65. See In re American Food Purveyors, 17 U.C.C. REP. SEtv. 436, 441 (N.D. Ga. 1971)
(holding that Code definition of purchase in § 1-201(32) and (33) does not apply to § 2-702(3)
purchaser), infra notes 65-73 and accompanying text (discussion of American Food Purveyors).
66. 17 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 436 (N.D. Ga. 1974).
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bankruptcy. 67 The court in American Food Purveyors conceded that an
Article 9 secured creditor qualifies as a good faith purchaser for value under
sections 1-201(32) and 1-201(33),68 but held that the definition of purchaser
in sections 1-201(32) and 1-201(33) of the Code did not apply to "purchaser"
as used in section 2-702(3).69 The district court concluded that section 2-702
protects only Article 2 purchasers and not Article 9 secured creditors.7 0 To
hold otherwise, the court in American Food Purveyors maintained, would
violate the Code policy of liberally administering a seller's reclamation right .7 t
Commentators consider the American Food Purveyors decision a distortion
of the Code that "must be read to be believed.""' "While attacking the court's
holding as inconsistent with Code language, both courts and commentators
concede that the court's construction of the Code in American Food Purveyors
is often more equitable than the majority construction of the Code.""
Only one other recorded opinion interprets the Code as allowing a
defrauded seller to reclaim his goods from an insolvent buyer when a secured

67. Id. at 438-39. The secured creditor in American Food Purveyors was a factor in an
ongoing relationship with the buyer. Id. at 438. Since the secured creditor failed to police the
buyer's financial resources, the district court determined that the secured creditor was disinterested in the buyer's financial condition. Id. at 442. The American Food Purveyors court also
concluded that the secured creditor failed to exercise due diligence when the creditor withheld
information of the buyer's insolvency from the seller, which allowed the attachment of a
floating lien on the seller's goods once the goods were in the hands of the buyer. Id.
68. Id. at 441. The American Food Purveyors court stated that the Code definition of
purchase is "broad enough to include an Article 9 secured creditor." Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. The American Food Purveyors court apparently determined that the policy of
Georgia's Commercial Code favors protecting a seller's right to reclaim over the policy suggested
by Judge Godbold in Samuels of promoting the free flow of goods. Id. at 441; see supra note
6 (Judge Godbold in Samuels notes that Code policy favors free flow of goods). Bankruptcy
Judge Drake in American Food Purveyors maintained that courts could best promote the policy
of protecting the seller's reclamation right by interpreting the purchaser in section 2-702(3) as
excluding Article 9 secured creditors. American Food Purveyors, 17 U.C.C. REP. SERv. at 441.
In addition to holding that an Article 9 secured creditor is not a purchaser under section
2-702(3), the American Food Purveyors court also suggested in dicta that an insolvent buyer
could not transfer title to a secured creditor. Id. at 443. The American Food Purveyors court
held that the secured creditor receives no more rights to the defrauded seller's goods than the
buyer, rejecting the holding of Hayward Woolen to the contrary. Id.; see Hayward Woolen, 3
U.C.C. REP. SERV. at 1110-12 (holding that buyer with voidable title can transfer good title to
good faith purchaser for value). In fact, the American Food Purveyors court specifically
rejected the holding of Hayward Woolen. American Food Purveyors, 17 U.C.C. REP. SERV. at
442.
72. See Jackson and Peters, Quest for Uncertainty:A Proposalfor Flexible Resolution
of Inherent Conflicts Between Article 2 and Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 87
YALE L.J. 907, 956 n.216 (1978) (American Food Purveyors opinion- has to be read to be
believed); WHrrE & SuMMES, supra note 1, at 1027-28 (expressing "distaste" for American
Food Purveyors decision).
73. See In re Bowman, 25 U.C.C. RP. SERV. 738, 743 (limitingAmerican Food Purveyors
holding to cases in which equities lay with seller); B & P Lumber Co. v. First Nat. Bank of
Atlanta, 25 U.C.C. REP. SERv. 1033 (Ga. App. 1978) (same).
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creditor has a floating lien on the buyer's inventory. 74 In a decision that was
reversed on appeal, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania held in In re Emery Corporation75 that a secured

creditor with a floating lien on a buyer's inventory did not qualify as a
purchaser under section 2-702(3) unless the secured creditor advanced "new
value" to the debtor after the seller delivered the goods but before the seller
made his reclamation demand. 76 The Emery court reasoned that, because the
insolvent buyer had voidable title to the seller's goods, 7 7 the seller could
divest the buyer of title under section 2-702(2) by reclaiming the goods. 7 A
good faith purchaser of the goods, according to the Emery court, could
prevent the seller from divesting the buyer of title to the goods, but only if

the purchaser acted affirmatively by issuing credit to the buyer in receipt of

a security interest. 79 A floating lien creditor, however, rarely advances new

74. See In re Emery Corp., 38 Bankr. 489, 493 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984) (holding that
secured creditor must advance new value to qualify as purchaser), rev'd, Lavonia Mfg. Co. v.
Emery Corp., 41 U.C.C. REP. S.RV. 1172 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
75. 38 Bankr. 489 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984), rev'd, Lavonia Mfg. Co. v. Emergy Corp.,
41 U.C.C. REP. SERv. 1172 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
76. Id. at 496.
77. Id. at 493. See U.C.C. § 2-403 (voidable title doctrine). Section 2-403 of the Code
lists circumstances in which a buyer receives voidable title. Id. at § 2-403(1)(a)-(d). The voidable
title doctrine, however, is not limited to the circumstances listed in section 2-403, but extends
to all cases in which good faith purchasers receive goods pursuant to a transaction of purchase.
See Anderson, supra note 2, at 277-78 (maintaining that enumerated situations resulting in
voidable title are not exhaustive).
78. Emery, 38 Bankr. at 496.
79. Id. The court in Emery found that the broad definition of purchaser in 1-201(33) did
not apply to section 2-702(3). Id. at 493. To support its reasoning that the Code definition of
purchaser in sections 1-201(32) and (33) does not apply to a 2-702(3) purchaser, the Emery
court noted that the lead sentence of section 1-201 indicates that the words defined in that
section are to have the meanings given unless the context suggests otherwise. Id.; U.C.C § 1201. The Emery court concluded that the context of the purchaser in section 2-702(3) suggests
that the section 1-201(33) definition was inapplicable. Emery, 38 Bankr. at 493. As support for
its conclusion, the Emery court noted that section 2-403 of the Code provides that an insolvent
buyer who accepts goods receives only voidable title, which implies that the debtor's title to the
goods was not void automatically, but rather was voidable for some time after delivery of the
goods. Id.; see U.C.C. § 2-403(1) (person with voidable title can transfer good title to good
faith purchaser for value). Section 2-403 of the Code does not state specifically that a seller
gives voidable title to an insolvent buyer. U.C.C. § 2-403(l)(a)-(d). The Code language in section
2-403, however, suggests that a seller transfers voidable title not only in the specific instances
mentioned in the Code, but also to any transferee under a transaction of purchase. Anderson,
supra note 2, at 278-79; see supra note 77 (voidable title doctrine not limited to specific
circumstances listed in § 2-403(1)). The Emery court reasoned that the right to void the debtor's
title continues untif either the 10 day limitation set out in section 2-702(2) has run or the secured
party purchases an interest in the debtor's goods by advancing new value to the debtor. Emery,
38 Bankr. at 493. Thus, a key element in the Emery court's analysis of the voidable title
doctrine is that the voidable title doctrine does not apply unless the title is voidable for a period
of time. Id. The Emery court emphasized that a secured party must take some affirmative
action before the creditor acquires an interest in the goods. Id. The Emery court held that a
buyer's voidable title could end either through a seller's reclamation, a buyer's purchase of the
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value to a debtor but rather relies on an after-acquired property clause to
attach his security interest to the debtor's property.80 Consequently, under
the Emery court's analysis, a secured creditor with a floating lien would
seldom qualify as a purchaser that defeats a reclaiming seller under section
2-702(3).?' On appeal, the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania reversed Emery in Lavonia Manufacturing Company v.
Emery Corporation.2 The district court in Lavonia, citing the Code definition

of value, held that a secured creditor qualifies as a purchaser of an interest
as long as he acquires his interest in "total or partial satisfaction of a
'
preexisting debt." 83
Therefore, under the court's holding in Lavonia, a

floating lien creditor would always qualify as a "purchaser"8 of his security
interest and would defeat a reclaiming seller under 2-702. 4
While the Emery court's analysis is inconsistent with Code language,"

the court's reasoning emphasizes the automatic nature of a secured creditor's
goods, or a secured creditor's voluntary purchase of an interest in the goods after the seller
delivers the goods to the insolvent buyer. Id. If a secured creditor's inventory lien attaches to
goods the moment a seller delivers the goods to a buyer, then the buyer's title, according to the
Emery court, was never void. Id. at 493. Instead, good title transfers to the secured creditor
immediately upon delivery. Id. The Emery court concluded that a secured creditor could not
purchase a valid interest in an insolvent buyer's goods by way of the floating lien without
violating the voidable title concept of section 2-403. Id. The Emery court, however, based its
interpretation of section 2-403 of the Code on the faulty assumption that a title must be void
for a period of time before the voidable title doctrine of section 2-403 allows a subsequent
transfer of good title. Id. at 493-94. If a party contracts with an insolvent buyer to purchase
goods that are identified to the contract upon delivery, then, under the Emery court's analysis,
voidable title never passes to the buyer because the goods belong to the purchaser immediately
upon their delivery. See U.C.C. § 2-501(1) (stating that buyer has interest in goods as soon as
goods are identified to purchase contract). Consequently, under the Emery holding, good title
cannot pass to purchasers for value or buyers in the ordinary course of business under the
voidable title doctrine of section 2-403 because the insolvent buyer never had voidable title, See
id. at 493 (voidable title can mature into good title before 10 day limit in which seller can
make reclamation demand only if party gives consideration for goods after delivery of goods
to insolvent buyer). The Emery court's construction of the Code doctrine of voidable title would
frustrate the transfer of good title to good faith purchasers and buyers in the ordinary course
of business who contract with buyers for goods prior to delivery of the goods. See id. at 493
(voidable title cannot mature into good title without passing of time). The Emery rationale
would force purchasers to enter contracts to buy only goods that a buyer has on hand. Such
an interpretation would hinder the general Code policy favoring the free flow of goods. See
U.C.C. § 2-403 comment 1 (section 2-403 promotes basic policy of allowing easy transfer of
goods); supra note 6 (discussing general Code policy of promoting free flow of goods).
80. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text (discussion of after-acquired property
clause).
81. See notes 76-79 and accompanying text (Emery holding requires new value before
secured creditor can qualify as purchaser under § 2-702(3)). The after-acquired property clause
allows a secured creditor to attach his security interest to future goods coming into a buyer's
inventory. U.C.C. § 9-204. Consequently, secured creditors need not advance new value to
attach their security interest to incoming inventory. Id. at comment 2.
82. 41 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 1172, 1178 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
83. Id. at 1175-76.
84. See id. (negotiating floating lien is purchase and secured creditor with floating lien
qualifies as purchaser who defeats reclaiming seller under § 2-702(3)).
85. See Emery, 38 Bankr. at 493. To support its holding that the Code definition of
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purchase. 86 Traditionally, to give value a creditor had to rely on the interest

the creditor purchased.87 Under an after-acquired property clause in a floating
lien, a secured creditor's interest attaches automatically and perhaps even

without the knowledge of the creditor.8" Courts differ on the question whether
a creditor can rely on an interest without knowing the interest exists.8 9 The
bankruptcy judge in Emery envisions a good faith purchaser, including a

secured creditor, as a party who consciously negotiates an interest in and
thereby relies upon a buyer's goods. 90 In contrast, a majority of courts allows
a secured creditor to defeat unconsciously the seller's reclamation right via
a floating lien. 9' To eliminate a creditor's "unconscious reliance" on a

purchaser in sections 1-201(32) and (33) does not apply to the section 2-702(3) purchaser, the
Emery court noted that section 2-702(3) of Pennsylvania's version of the Code specifically states
that the right of a reclaiming seller is subject to the rights of both a purchaser and a lien
creditor. Id. at 493; see 13 PA. CoNs. STAT. § 2702 (Pennsylvania has not adopted 1966
amendment to Code eliminating lien creditor as party to whom seller's reclamation right is
subject). The court then noted that "purchaser" as defined in sections 1-201(32) and (33) also
includes a lien creditor. 38 Bankr. at 493; U.C.C. §§ 1-201(32) and (33). The Emery court
concluded that the reference to lien creditor in section 2-702(3) would be redundant if a
purchaser, already mentioned in section 2-702(3), included the lien creditor. 38 Bankr. at 493.
The Emery court's rationale would be persuasive if "taking by lien" in section 1-201(32)
described how the lien creditor of section 2-702(3) acquires his interest. The language in section
1-201(32), however, indicates that a purchaser must take voluntarily. U.C.C. § 1-201(32). The
Code states in section 1-201(32) that a purchase includes "taking by lien," but concludes the
definition with the phrase "or any other voluntary transaction creating an interest in property."
Id. Thus, a secured creditor with a lien on a buyer's property is a purchaser only if the creditor
acquires an interest in a buyer's property by means of a voluntary lien. See U.C.C. §§ 1-201(32)
and (33) (party must purchase goods via voluntary transaction to qualify as purchaser under §
1-201(32) and § 1-201(33)). The reference to lien creditor in section 2-702(3), on the other hand,
refers to a lien resulting from an involuntary attachment of the buyer's goods. See U.C.C. § 2702(3). Consequently, the use of "lien creditor" in section 2-702(3) is different from the
reference to "taking by lien" in section 1-201(32).
86. See infra notes 87-91 and accompanying text (discussing reliance factor necessary at
common law to purchase interest in collateral).
87. McDonnell, supra note 29, at 452. See generally McDonnell, supra note 29, at 451-56
(general discussion of reliance factor as requirement for purchasing interest in collateral).
88. See Samuels II, 526 F.2d at 1242-43 (security interest attached automatically because
of after-acquired property clause); Countryman, Buyers and Sellers of Goods in Bankruptcy, I
N.M. L. REv. 435, 458 n.119 (1971) (secured creditor with floating lien on inventory often
unconsciously purchases interest in inventory).
89. See McDonnell, supra note 29, at 454-56 (discussing reliance factor necessary to
qualify as purchaser for value).
90. Emery, 38 Bankr. at 496.
91. See, e.g., Holiday Rambler Corp. v. Morris, 32 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 1222, 1224-25
(D. Kan. 1981) (because antecedent debt constitutes value sufficient to purchase interest, secured
creditor acquires interest in incoming inventory unconsciously through floating lien); Eagle
Chrysler-Dodge Sales, Inc. v. Genesee Merchants Bank & Trust Co., 143 Mich. App. 339,.
, 372 N.W.2d 546, 54849 (Mich. App. 1985) (same); First Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v.
Academic Archives, Inc., 8 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 1197, 1201 (N.C. Ct. App. 1971) (same); supra
note 88 and accompanying text (floating lien attaches to seller's goods automatically and without
knowledge of secured party as soon as goods become part of the buyer's inventory); infra notes
96-104 and accompanying text (presence of floating lien destroys seller's reclamation right).
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buyer's future inventory, the bankruptcy judge in Emery held that the

automatic attachment of a buyer's inventory by way of an after-acquired
property clause is not a "purchase" under section 2-403.92
While most courts agree with the district court in Lavonia and have
found that a secured creditor with a floating lien qualifies as a purchaser

for value, courts are split on whether the floating lien merely defeats the
seller's reclamation right or terminates the reclamation right entirely.93 Under

a strict reading of the Code, the presence of a secured creditor's floating
lien on a buyer's inventory abolishes a defrauded seller's section 2-702
reclamation right regardless of whether the secured creditor must resort to
94
proceeds from the seller's goods to satisfy the creditor's security interest.

Consequently, courts adopting a literal reading of the Code hold that a seller
loses his reclamation right entirely if a secured creditor has a floating lien
on a buyer's inventory." In In re Bensar," the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Ohio characterized a seller's reclamation right
as an exercise in futility when a secured creditor has a floating lien on the
buyer's inventory. 97 The sellers in Bensar argued that the right to reclaim

under section 2-702(2) is tantamount to a security interest arising under
Article 2. 91 Under section 9-113 of the Code, a creditor can enforce a security

92. Emery, 38 Bankr. at 493; see supra notes 75-82 and accompanying text (discussion of
Emery).
93. See Westside Bank, 38 U.C.C. REP. SERV. at 715-16 (holding that seller's reclamation
fight survives secured creditor's floating lien); infra notes 108-12 and accompanying text
(discussion of Westside Bank). But cf. Bensar, 38 U.C.C. REP. SERV. at 828-30 (defrauded
seller loses right to reclaim when secured creditor has floating lien on buyer's inventory); infra
notes 96-104 and accompanying text (discussion of Bensar).
94. See Bensar, 38 U.C.C. REP. SERV. at 826, 829-30 (presence of floating lien on buyer's
inventory destroys seller's reclamation right against trustee in bankruptcy); Skilton, supra note
39, at 945 (Code language supports holding that floating lien terminates seller's reclamation
fight); QUINN, supra note 10, at s2-339 (under strict reading of Code, seller's reclamation
demand is exercise in futility if secured creditor has floating lien on buyer's inventory); see
generally R. NORDSTROM, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF SALES 515 (discussing circumstances in
which purchaser terminates seller's right to reclaim under Code).
95. See Bensar, 38 U.C.C. REP. SERV. at 829-30 (seller loses right to reclaim when secured
creditor has floating lien on buyer's inventory); infra notes 96-104 and accompanying text

(discussion of Bensar).
96. 38 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 823 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1984).

97. See id. at 826-29 (Bensar court found reclaiming sellers' arguments unpersuasive);
infra notes 98-100 and accompanying text (discussing arguments posited by reclaiming sellers in
Bensar).
98. Bensar, 38 U.C.C. REP. SEav. at 827-28. In addition to arguing that they had an
automatic security interest in goods sold to the insolvent buyer, the reclaiming sellers in Bensar
maintained that, by virtue of language on the bottom of a printed invoice, the sellers reserved
an interest in the goods sold to the insolvent buyer. Id. Relying on section 2-401 of the Code,
the sellers maintained that the retention of title evidenced by the language on the invoice
prevented good title from passing to the buyer until both parties had satisfied all financial
conditions of the transaction. Id. at 826-27; see U.C.C. §§ 2-401(1) and (2) (Code sections
governing reservation of title to goods as security for payment). The Bensar court noted first
that the sellers never mentioned to the buyers the language on the invoice. Id. at 827. Next, the
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interest arising under Article 2 without filing a financing statement or
obtaining possession of the goods as long as the debtor did not lawfully
obtain possession of the goods. 99 The sellers in Bensar argued that the buyer
did not lawfully obtain possession of the goods because the buyer received
the goods while insolvent.' °° The Bensar court flatly rejected the seller's
argument, holding that the language of section 2-702(2) does not create a
security interest as defined in section 1-201(37) of the Code.' 0 ' The Bensar
court concluded that the presence of a secured creditor with a floating lien
on the buyer's inventory ended the seller's reclamation right against the
insolvent buyer and also against any other party.'0 2 Since a secured creditor
had a lien on the buyer's inventory in Bensar, the district court precluded
the seller from reclaiming goods in the hands of the trustee in bankruptcy.103
While conceding that its holding was "harsh," the Bensar court noted that
the defrauded seller could have avoided losing his goods to the secured
creditor by obtaining and perfecting a purchase money security interest in
the goods." 4
While most courts agree with the Bensar court's holding that a secured
creditor with a floating lien has priority over a reclaiming seller, some courts

court pointed out that the sellers were aware that the buyer had presold the goods in question.
Id. The Bensar court reasoned that the sellers intended that title pass to the buyers upon
delivery. Id. Finally, and most importantly, the Bensar court noted that even if the buyer
received only voidable title, the buyer could still transfer good title to a good faith purchaser
for value under section 2-403. Id.
99. See U.C.C. § 9-113. Section 113 of Article 9 provides that a security interest arising
under Article 2 need not be the product of a security agreement, nor filed, if the interest is in
property in the hands of a buyer who did not lawfully obtain possession of the goods. Id.
100. Bensar, 38 U.C.C. REP. SERV. at 827 n.3.
101. Bensar, 38 U.C.C. REP. SERV. at 827. The Bensar court held that section 9-113 of
the Code describes the impact of an Article 2 security interest and not the source of the interest.
Id.; cf. U.C.C. § 9-113 (explaining automatic perfection of certain security interest). The district
court held that the plaintiff in Bensar did not create a writing intended as a security interest
and thus retained no interest in the goods sold to the insolvent buyer. Bensar, 38 U.C.C. REp.
SERv. at 827; see U.C.C. § 1-201(37) (definition of security interest).
102. See Bensar, 38 U.C.C. REp. SERV. at 827. The reclaiming seller in Bensar sought to
reclaim goods, not from the secured creditor with a floating lien nor an insolvent buyer, but
from the buyer's trustee in bankruptcy. Id. at 826. The secured creditor in Bensar had satisfied
his interest and the remaining goods were in the hands of the trustee in bankruptcy. Id. The
Bensar court, however, held that the presence of a floating lien on the buyer's inventory ended
the seller's right to reclaim goods. Id. at 826-30.
103. Id. at 829-30.
104. Id. at 830. Section 9-312(3) of the Code governs the requirements necessary for a
seller to perfect a purchase money security interest in inventory. U.C.C. § 9-312(3). Under
section 9-312(3)(b), a secured party must give notification in writing to holders of conflicting
security interests if the holders of those conflicting interests have filed a financing statement
before the seller files his purchase money security interest. Id. at § 9-312(3)(b). The holder of a
conflicting perfected security interest also must receive notice of the purchase money security
interest within five years before the debtor receives the goods perfected. Id. at § 9-312(3)(c). If
a party seeking a purchase money security interest complies with all of the requirements of
section 9-312(3), "a feat of some consequence," that party will take priority over any conflicting
security interest. Id.; WhrrE & SUMMERS, supra note 1, at 1048.
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have found that the presence of a floating lien on a buyer's inventory does
not terminate the seller's reclamation right. 03 Courts holding that a seller's

reclamation right survives a secured creditor's floating lien have concluded
that a seller has a right to reclaim goods or proceeds from the sale of goods
from an insolvent buyer, but only after the secured creditor has satisfied his
interest out of the buyer's inventory.' °6 Courts that allow a seller a right to
reclaim after a secured creditor has satisfied his interest classify the seller's
2-702(2) reclamation right as a security interest. 0 7 In United States v.
Westside Bank, '0 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
held that a secured creditor with a floating lien had a duty to protect the
interest of a reclaiming seller after the secured creditor had satisfied his
interest out of the buyer's inventory. °9 The Fifth Circuit in Westside Bank
characterized the seller's section 2-702(2) reclamation right as an unperfected
"junior security interest."" 0 The Westside Bank court also found that, after
the secured creditor had satisfied his interest out of the proceeds from the
sale of the buyer's inventory, the secured creditor had a duty to apply the

remaining proceeds to satisfy any junior security interest."' Under the
105. See Westside Bank, 38 U.C.C. REP. SERv. at 712-13 (reclaiming seller takes second
priority to buyer's assets behind secured creditors); infra notes 108-12 and accompanying text
(discussion of Westside Bank); Holiday Rambler Corp. v. Morris, 32 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 1222,
1226 (D. Kan. 1981) (seller's right to reclaim is security interest arising under Article 9 of
Uniform Commercial Code); In re Metal Tech. Mfg., Inc., 27 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 701 (Bankr.
D. Utah 1979) (same).
106. See Westside Bank, 38 U.C.C. REP. SERV. at 711-13 (reclaiming seller has second
priority to goods behind secured creditor); Holiday Rambler, 32 U.C.C. REP. SERV. at 1225-26
(same); infra notes 108-12 and accompanying text (discussion of Westside Bank).
107. Westside Bank, 38 U.C.C. REP. SERv. at 713; see infra notes 108-12 and accompanying
text (discussion of Westside Bank); Anderson, supra note 2, at 295-97 (seller's reclamation right
survives floating lien if court finds reclamation right to be security interest).
108. 38 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 705 (5th Cir. 1984).
109. Id. at 711. The Westside Bank court held not only that the seller could reclaim after
the secured creditor had satisfied his interest, but also that the seller has a right to proceeds
from the sale of his goods. Id. at 712. But cf.Bensar, 38 U.C.C. REP. SERV. at 826 (holding
that reclaiming seller cannot reclaim proceeds from sale of goods).
A controversy underlying a seller's right to reclaim goods from an insolvent buyer is
whether the seller can reclaim proceeds from the sale of his goods. QUINN, supra note 10, at
s2-339. The controversy usually turns on whether a court classifies a seller's reclamation right
as a security interest, in which case the seller would be entitled to proceeds, Westside Bank, 38
U.C.C. REP. SERV. at 715-16, or as a right to rescind the transaction, in which case the seller
can recover only the goods sold to an insolvent buyer. See Bensar, 38 U.C.C. REP. SERV. at
826 (reclaiming seller is not entitled to proceeds from sale of his goods).
110. Westside Bank, 38 U.C.C. REP. SERV. at 713.
111. Id. The Westside Bank court reasoned that a secured creditor's right to dispose of an
insolvent buyer's inventory is subject to Article 2. Id.; see U.C.C. § 9-504(1) (governing secured
party's right to dispose of collateral upon debtor's default). The Westside Bank court held that
the seller's reclamation right is a limitation on the secured creditor's ability to dispose of the
debtor's assets. Westside Bank, 38 U.C.C. REP. SERV. at 713. The Westside Bank court further
concluded that, under section 9-504(1) of the Code, secured creditors must apply the proceeds
from the sale of the debtor's inventory to all junior security interests after the secured creditors
have satisfied their senior security interests. Id.; see U.C.C. § 9-504(l) (governing secured
party's right to dispose of collateral upon debtor's default).
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Westside Bank analysis, a seller's reclamation right is subordinate to the
rights of a secured creditor with a floating lien, but survives the presence of
a floating lien and the seller may satisfy his interest in the buyer's inventory
2
prior to general creditors of the buyer."1
The holdings of the United States District Court for the Southern District
of Ohio in Bensar and the Fifth Circuit in Westside Bank represent the
dichotomy existing in the courts over the fate of the section 2-702 reclamation
right in the presence of a floating lien." a While the Westside Bank analysis
affords relief to a defrauded seller, the Westside Bank court's classification
of the section 2-702 reclamation right as a security interest is inconsistent
with Code language."14 Section 9-102(2) defines a security interest as a
transaction "intended to create a security interest.""' 5 A seller's reclamation
right does not satisfy the definition of security interest unless the seller enters
a transaction intending to create a security interest." 6 If a seller enters a
transaction with the buyer to retain a security interest in goods, the seller
has taken a purchase money security interest in the goods and, under 9312(3) defeats the floating lien secured creditor. ' 7 Thus, if the seller has a
security interest, he need not resort to the 2-702 reclamation right to recover
his goods. '8
Defining the seller's reclamation right as a security interest undermines
not only Code language, but also the Code drafters' goal that a reclaiming
seller shall defeat lien creditors of a buyer." 9 Many states have eliminated
the lien creditor as a party that defeats the seller's reclamation right under

112. See Westside Bank, 38 U.C.C. REP. SERV. at 713-14 (Code entitles reclaiming seller
to second priority in proceeds from sale of insolvent buyer's goods if seller properly makes
demand); Samuels II,526 F.2d at 1246 (same). But see In re Mel Golde Shoes, Inc., 403 F.2d
658, 660 (6th Cir. 1968) (holding that seller's reclamation right is not security interest); Ranchers
and Farmers Livestock Auction Co. v. First State Bank, 531 S.W.2d 167 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975)
(same).
113. See supra notes 96-104 and accompanying text (discussion of Bensar holding that
reclamation right is not security interest); supra notes 108-12 and accompanying text (discussion
of Westside Bank holding that reclamation right is security interest).
114. See U.C.C. § 9-102(1)(a) (security interest is transaction intended to create interest);
infra note 115 and accompanying text (seller's right to reclaim does not satisfy Code requirements
for security interest).
115. U.C.C. § 9-102. Section 9-102 of the Code sets forth the policy and subject matter of
Article 9. Id. Section 9-102(2) states in pertinent part that Article 9 "applies to security interests
created by contract ...

intended as security." Id.

116. U.C.C. § 9-102(2); see infra note 115 and accompanying text (security interest arises
only when parties intend for transaction to create security interest).
117. See U.C.C. § 9-107 (definition of purchase money security interest); U.C.C. § 9312(3) (perfected purchase money security interest takes priority over conflicting security interests
in same inventory).
118. See Bensar, 36 Bankr. at 830 (reclaiming seller need not rely on § 2-702 reclamation
right if seller perfects purchase money security interest in goods); King Foods v. Erie Farms,
34 U.C.C. REp. SERV. 109, 113, 21 Pa. D. & C.2d 434 (1981) (same).
119. See HAWKILAND, supra note 5, at 239 (Code drafters eliminated lien creditor as party
to whose rights Code subjects seller's reclamation right).
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section 2-702(3)220 If courts classify a seller's right to reclaim as an unperfected security interest, however, then a lien creditor will defeat a reclaiming
seller because, under section 9-301(1)(b) of the Code, a lien creditor takes
his interest in a debtor's assets prior to creditors with unperfected security
interests.' 2' Courts can prevent lien creditors from defeating the reclamation
right of a seller by reasoning that, if a seller's reclamation right is a security
interest, then the interest is automatically perfected under section 9-113 of
the Code. 22 Consequently, a seller would prevail over a lien creditor because
the seller would have a perfected security interest in a buyer's goods.' 23 On
the other hand, a reclaiming seller would lose to an Article 9 secured creditor
because the secured creditor filed or perfected his security interest before the
24
seller's security interest attached.
If a secured creditor has a perfected interest in a buyer's inventory,
classifying the seller's right to reclaim as a security interest gives the seller
second priority after the secured creditor has satisfied his interest.' 2 If,
however, a secured creditor has an unperfected lien on a buyer's inventory,
classifying the seller's right to reclaim as a security interest may allow the
seller to defeat the claim of the unperfected inventory lender. 26 In Guy
Martin Buick, Inc. v. ColoradospringsNational Bank, 127 the Supreme Court

of Colorado agreed that a seller with a security interest in goods sold to an
insolvent buyer defeats an unperfected secured creditor with a floating lien
on the buyer's inventory.

28

The court in Guy Martin Buick, however, held

that section 2-702(2) does not create a security interest in favor of a defrauded
seller.

29

The plaintiff in Guy Martin Buick delivered goods to an insolvent

120. See id. (thirty-three states have adopted 1966 Code amendment eliminating lien creditor
as party whose rights section 2-702(3) subjects seller's reclamation right).
121. See U.C.C. § 9-301(l)(b) (rights of creditor with unperfected security interest are
subordinate to rights of lien creditor whose lien attached before creditor had perfected security
interest).
122. See U.C.C. § 9-113 (creditor need not file to perfect security interest if buyer unlawfully
obtained goods from creditor).
123. Id.
124. See U.C.C. § 9-312(5)(a) (conflicting perfected security interests in same collateral
take priority according to time of filing or perfection).
125. See Westside Bank, 38 U.C.C. REP. SERV. at 713. The Westside Bank court held that
a secured creditor with a floating lien has a duty to protect the interests of other creditors. Id.
The court noted that section 9-504(a) makes a secured creditor's right to dispose of collateral
subject to Article 2. Id. The Westside Bank court concluded that the secured creditor could not
dispose of the buyer's inventory until the reclaiming seller satisfied his interest from the
remainder of the goods. Id.
126. See infra notes 127-37 and accompanying text (seller would have defeated inventory
lender with unsecured floating lien if court in Guy Martin Buick, Inc. v. Colorado Springs Nat.
Bank had classified seller's section 2-702 right to reclaim as security interest); see Guy Martin
Buick, Inc. v. Colo. Springs Nat. Bank, 519 F.2d 354, 359 (Guy Martin Buick court refused to
classify seller's reclamation right as security interest).
127. 519 P.2d 354 (Colo. 1974).
128. Id. at 359.
129. Id.
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buyer in exchange for payment by check.' 30 The drawee bank dishonored the
check and the plaintiff filed a timely reclamation demand and recovered the
goods.' 3 ' A secured creditor with an unperfected lien on the buyer's inventory
brought a successful action against the seller for the goods as a good faith
purchaser under section 2-403.132 The seller appealed, arguing that his reclamation right was a security interest perfected upon repossession of the
goods.' 3 The seller maintained that his perfected security interest defeated
the inventory lender's unperfected interest in the goods.'3 4 The Guy Martin
Buick court, adopting a literal reading of the Code, concluded that a seller's
right to reclaim was a right to rescind a transaction with an insolvent buyer
and not a security interest. 35 The court stated in dicta, however, that had
the seller's right to reclaim fit within the Code definition of a security
interest, the seller would have prevailed in the action.' 36 Consequently,
whether a seller can protect his interest in goods sold to an insolvent buyer
37
often depends on how a court classifies the seller's reclamation right.'
While a seller's right to reclaim often depends on a court's classification
of the section 2-702 reclamation right, sellers may not know how a particular
court defines the right to reclaim. Therefore, to protect his interest a seller
should obtain and perfect a purchase money security interest and not rely
on the section 2-702 right to reclaim. 38 While perfecting a purchase money
security interest in inventory is tedious and time consuming, 3 9 a seller who
fails to perfect an Article 9 security interest risks losing his goods to a
secured creditor with a floating lien on the buyer's inventory.'4 If a seller
fails to file a purchase money security interest on goods sold to an insolvent
buyer and a secured creditor with a floating lien claims the seller's goods as
part of the buyer's inventory, the seller may argue that his reclamation right

130. Id. at 355-56.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 356.
133. Id. at 359.
134. Id. The seller in Guy Martin Buick claimed that he perfected his security interest in
the goods by repossessing the goods before the secured creditor perfected his interest in the
buyer's inventory. Id.; see U.C.C. § 9-312(5)(a) (first security interest filed or perfected takes
priority over other security interests in same collateral).
135. Guy Martin Buick, 519 P.2d at 359.
136. Id.
137. Compare Westside Bank, 38 U.C.C. RP. SEsv. at 713 (seller's reclamation right is
security interest and thus survives floating lien) and supra notes 108-12 and accompanying text
(discussion of Westside Bank) with Bensar, 38 U.C.C. REP. SERV. at 826-30 (seller's reclamation
right is right to rescind contract with insolvent buyer and thus reclamation right does not
survive floating lien) and supra notes 96-104 and accompanying text (discussion of Bensar).
138. See Bensar, 38 U.C.C. REP. SERV. at 829-30 (holding that seller must take out
purchase money security interest for absolute protection).
139. See U.C.C. § 9-312(3). To perfect a purchase money security interest in inventory, a
seller must file a financing statement and give notice of the purchase money security interest to
all secured creditors with conflicting security interests. Id.
140. See supra notes 15-34 and accompanying text (majority of courts hold that seller loses
right to reclaim if secured creditor has floating ierr on buyer's inventory).
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is an unperfected security interest. 141 If the court accepts the seller's argument,
then the seller will lose to creditors with perfected security interests and
perhaps to lien creditors, but will prevail over general creditors.' 42 As one
' 43
commentator noted, "half a loaf ... is better than no loaf at all. '
Alternatively, a seller may argue that a secured inventory lender is not a
purchaser of an interest in the goods in the hands of an insolvent buyer and
thereby attempt to defeat the claim of all secured creditors whether perfected
or not. 1" Most courts, however, have rejected this argument. 145 A seller's
argument that a floating lien secured creditor is not a purchaser probably
will not prevail since most courts interpret the Code in accordance with prior
decisions in their jurisdiction and, if the issue has not yet come to trial in
the jurisdiction, courts usually adopt the prevailing view in an effort to
promote a consistent interpretation of the Code.' 46
The interpretation that allows a reclaiming seller to defeat the rights of
a secured creditor or at least a secured creditor with a floating lien on the
buyer's inventory represents an extreme solution to the priority problems of
section 2-702.' 4 On the other hand, a literal interpretation of the Code often
unnecessarily deprives a defrauded seller of his reclamation right against an
insolvent buyer. 148 Code language suggests that the mere presence of a floating
lien on a buyer's inventory destroys a seller's right to reclaim regardless of
14
whether a secured creditor needs the goods to satisfy the creditor's interest.
The equitable middle ground classifies a seller's right to reclaim as an
unperfected security interest that gives a reclaiming seller second priority
behind secured creditors. 150 Interpreting a seller's reclamation right as a

141. See supra notes 108-12 and accompanying text (discussing court holdings that classify
reclamation right as security interest).
142. See Westside Bank, 38 U.C.C. REP. SERV. at 715-16 (holding that secured inventory
lender must preserve remaining goods or proceeds for reclaiming seller after secured lender has
satisfied his interest); supra notes 114-24 and accompanying text (discussing implications of
classifying seller's right to reclaim as security interest).
143. QUINN, supra note 10, at s2-339.
144. See Emery, 38 Bankr. at 496 (reclaiming seller takes priority over rights of secured
creditor with floating lien), rev'd, 41 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 1172; supra notes 75-81 and accompanying text (discussion of Emery).
145. See Lavonia Mfg. Co. v. Emery Corp., 41 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 1172, 1178 (E.D. Pa.
1985) (reversing Emery ruling allowing defrauded seller to reclaim goods from insolvent buyer
despite presence of secured creditor's floating lien on buyer's inventory); Jackson and Peters,
supra note 72, at 957 n.216 (noting that few cases follow minority view that grants reclaiming
seller priority over secured creditor with floating lien).
146. See Samuels II, 526 F.2d at 1241-42 (all courts should interpret Code language alike).
147. See supra notes 65-92 and accompanying text (minority view protects seller at expense
of secured creditor).
148. See Bensar, 38 U.C.C. REP. SERv. at 826, 829-30 (presence of floating lien on buyer's
inventory terminates seller's reclamation right). But cf. Westside Bank, 38 U.C.C. REP. SERV.
at 713 (seller's reclamation right should survive floating lien).
149. See supra notes 95-104 and accompanying text (secured creditor with floating lien
defeats rights of seller to reclaim against any party).
150. See supra notes 108-12 and accompanying text (some courts allow reclaiming seller to
take second priority behind secured creditor).
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security interest, however, strains the section 1-201(37) definition of security
interest.' 5 ' Furthermore, if courts interpret a reclamation right as an unperfected security interest, then lien creditors may defeat a reclaiming seller
regardless of whether section 2-702(3) made the reclamation right subject to
5 2
the rights of a lien creditor.
Despite the drawbacks of classifying a seller's reclamation right as a
security interest, courts are more willing to adopt this equitable middle
ground than to follow the Emery court's approach of requiring a secured
inventory lender to advance new value for incoming goods before the lender's
interest in those goods will prevail over a defrauded seller's interest.' 5 3 Nothing
in the Code specifically requires new value for an interest to attach, and most
courts refuse to read this requirement into the Code. 5 4 In addition, the
majority of courts refuse to strain Code language by classifying the seller's
reclamation right as a security interest.' 55 Until drafters change the Code
language, the majority courts, having adopted a -strict interpretation of Code
definitions, will continue to allow a floating lien to destroy the seller's section
2-702 reclamation right.' 5 ' While this latter position "emasculate[s]" "', the
seller's right to reclaim, "it's hard to quarrel with the decision[s] as an application of statutory provisions." ' '
GARY BRYANT

151. See supra notes 114-24 and accompanying text (seller's reclamation right is not security
interest under Code).
152. See U.C.C. § 9-301(l)(b) (unperfected security interest is subordinate to rights of
person who becomes lien creditor before secured creditor perfects security interest).
153. See QunmN, supra note 10, at s2-338 (Emery is only recent opinion holding that
secured creditor must advance new value to debtor after debtor receives goods for creditor to
take security interest in such goods); Lavonia, 41 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 1172, 1178 (reversing
Emery).
154. See Samuels II, 526 F.2d at 1243-44. The Samuels court noted that the Code requires
only honesty in fact, reasonable commercial behavior, and fair dealing to qualify as a purchaser
for value. Id.
155. See Mel Golde Shoes, 403 F.2d at 660 (holding that seller's reclamation right is not
security interest); Bensar, 38 U.C.C. REP. SERV. at 827 (same).
156. Anderson, supra note 2, at 299.
157. Westside Bank, 38 U.C.C. REP. SERV. at 712.
158. Skilton, supra note 39, at 945.

